TILLETT v. WARD.

said "where there is an express warranty of the quality of an
article sold, in any respect, no further warranty will be implied
by the law. Thus, if a man sell a horse, and warrant it sound,
and the seller knows that it is intended to carry a lady, and the
horse is sound, but is not fit to carry a lady, there is no breach of
warranty. With respect to any other warranty beyond that
expressed, the maxim, is expressum facit cessare taciturn: MAULE,
J., in Dickson v. Zizinia, 70 E. 0. L. 602; Parkinson v. Lee, 2
East 314; Budd v. Tiairmaner,8 Bing 52."
In a sale by sample then, as a general rule, there is nio implied
warranty of merchantability, on the ground, expressio unius est
exclusio alterius. But where the sale by sample is held not to be a
warranty, probably there would be implied the warranty of merchantability, as was suggested by AGNEW, 0. J., in Boyd v. Wilson,
83 Penn. St. 319. So also there may perhaps be implied a warranty, though one is actually expressed, from the facts and circumstances of the case; on the authority of Mody v. Gregson, L. R.,
4 Exch. 49.
ARTHUR BIDDLE.
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TILLETT v. WARD.
W., a butcher, bought an ox at S. market. While his drovers were driving the
ox through the streets of S., it became unmanageable, and, without any negligence
on the part of the drovers, rushed into T.'s shop, and caused certain damage.
Held, that W. was not liable to T. in respect of the damage so committed.
Those who have houses adjoining a highway, whether in a town or in the country,
take upon themselves the risk of inevitable accident arising from traffic on the

highway.

THIS was an appeal by special case from the county court of
Lincolnshire holden at Stamford.
The defendant, a butcher, purchased an ox at market, and, while
the ox was being driven by his servants through the streets of
Stamford, it suddenly became unmanageable, and, without any
negligence on the part of the defendant or his servants, rushed
into the plaintiff's shop, which was adjacent to the street, and caused
damage to the extent of 11.
The county court judge gave judgment for the plaintiff for 11.,
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holding that it was a trespass for which the defendant was responsible.
The defendant appealed.
Moon (Graham with him), for the defendant.
Sills, for the plaintiff.
Lord CO.ERIDGE, 0. J.-In this case the county court judge has
given us a full statement of the facts, and it is sufficient to say
that he does not find that there was any negligence on the part
of the owner of the ox, or of his servants. Hence we start with
the fact that there was no negligence.
The following propositions of law are clear:First, as a general rule, the man who has cattle in his field must
keep his cattle from trespassing, and if they do trespass, his neighbor, on whose land they trespass, has a right of action against
the owner of the cattle, whether such trespass was or was not
occasioned by negligence.
Second, when the injury i done in the high road, where the
parties have a legal right to be, it must be showyn that the owner
of the cattle was himself guilty of negligence, or that his servant
was guilty of negligence under circumstances imposing a duty on
the master to use proper care. Again, if injury is done by an
animal in a vicious manner, in order to render the owner liable,
scienter must be proved.
In the present case the trespass was off the highway, thetrespass
having been committed by an animal off, but immediately adjoining,
the highway. I find it laid down in the case of Goodwynz v.
Cheveleyj, 4 H. & N. 631, that where a trespass is committed next
the highway by cattle, without any negligence on the part of theh
owner, that is a trespass for which the owner is not liable. In that
case the highway was in the country. It was said that this was only
an obiter dictum in that case, but I think that, so far from being an
obiter dictum, it was the ratio decidendi of the jugdment. This
view was also adopted by BLACKBurm, J., in -Fletcherv. Bylands,
L. R., 1 Ex. 265, I could not interfere, even if disposed to do so,
which I am not, with these decisions. But it is said that there is a
distinction between highways in the country and streets in towns.
I can see no distinction. Those who have houses adjoining streets
in a market town run certainlrisks from cattle being driven to and
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fiom market, and they must protect their houses and shops as best
they can. Unless, therefore, there is negligence, there is no liability.
Here there was no negligence, and so the judgment of the county
court judge was wrong, and must be reversed.
STEPHME,
J.-I am of the same opinion. The law on the matter may be summed up thus: so long as a maii has cattle on his
own land, it is his duty to keep them in and protect others against
their trespasses. When they are on the highway they are not
trespassing, and he is not liable for damage occasioned on the highway unless the damage is brought about by the negligence of himself or of his servants. There is one other case, and that is the
case of property adjacent to the highway. I agree with my lord
as to the law in this case. The reason is that it is necessary for
the common affairs of life to have the right to drive cattle or other
animals along the road, and people must protect their property in
some way. This is well-established law in the case of cattle doing
injury to property next a highway in the country, and we are asked
to draw a distinction between this and property adjacent to streets
in towns. I do not like to draw distinctions of this sort, and on
the whole, therefore, I arrive at the conclusion that the county court
judge was wrong.
Judgment reversed.
This subject has received more judicial investigation in this country than
in England, and these two propositions
are now well established.
1. If cattle lawfully on the highway
escape therefrom on to the land of an
adjoining proprietor, without any negligence in the owner or his servants, he is
not responsible for damage done on such
adjacent land. Highways are designed
for use, for the passage of animals as
well as of men ; and therefore if animals
while properly driven on the highway,
escape from the control of their keeper,
and stray on to private lands, the owner
is not responsible, if he uses all reasonable means to cause them to return to
the highway. Hartford v. Brady, 114
Mas. 466, is a recent direct authority
upon this point.
No apparent distinction exists, in this

respect, between country roads and city
streets. The odegree of care required
of the drover may be higher in the latter
case than in the former; but it being
proved or admitted that the proper degree of care was in fact used, the same
result follows in both cases. It cannot
be said exactly that the cattle are lawfully upon the private land in such
cases (McDonnell v. Pittsfield and 2orth
Adams Railroad Co., I IAass. 564) ; but
rather that the owner is not liable for
such casual and involuntary trespass.
The same rule was applied in Cool v.
Cromniet, 13 Mte. 250, where the defendant was using cattle in repairing
the highway, and they escaped from his
control, without his fault, and ran upon
the land of the plaintiff.
2. On the other hand if cattle are
unlawfully upon the highway, and thence
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stray upon adjoining land, the owner is
liable, at common lair, without any
proof of negligence, or want of care on
his part: Stackpole v. Healy, 16 Mass.
33; Lyman v. Gipson, 18 Pick. 422.
And they are unlawfully on the highway under this rule, if turned out to
graze thereon by the owner; since the
public have no right to use a public
highway as a pasture-ground, notwithstanding a common custom to do so,
in some parts of the country: Stackpole
v. Healey, supra; approved in Lord v.
Wormwood, 29 Ale. 288; Avery v. Mfaxwell, 4 N. H. 36 ; Afills v. Stark, 4 Ibid.
412. It is sometimes thought that a
vote of the town authorizing cattle to
run at large might make such a use of
the highway legal ; but as the grass and
herbage in the highway ordinarily belongs to the abutter, at least when, as
is usually the case, he owns the fee to the
centre of the road, and although he may
pasture his own cows there, under the care
of a keeper (Parker v. Jones, 1 Allen
270), it is difficult to see what right a
town has to authorize other persons to
take and carry away such owner's grass,
either by cutting or grazing. That
would be taking private property for
private uses, and without 'even the show
of making compensation therefor. Probably the only effect of such a municipal
vote is to shield the cattle-owner from
criminal or penal liability for violating
a town by-law or ordinance, but not to
protect him from a civil suit by the landowner injured. But however this may
be, without such municipal permission,
it is clear the owner is liable for the
cattle's trespass upon private lands ; and

at common law this is so, although the
landowner has no fences, or only insufficient fences along the highway; for
at common law, as is well known, no
man is bound to fence against other
men's cattle; he was bound to keep his
own animals in, but not to keep others
out. And the statutes of many states
imposing the duty of fencing upon the
landowner apply only to partitionfences
between private owners, and do not
require the farmer to fence along the
highway.
Therefore it was held in
Noyes v. Colby, 30 W. H. 132, that if
A. wrongfully enters the land of B.,
and by letting down the bars, or leaving
open a gate, is the cause of B.'s cattle
escaping and straying in the highway,
from whence they pass to the unfenced
land of an abutting proprietor, B. is
liable to the latter for the damage there
caused. This may appear very severe
upon the innocent owner of the cattle, so
wrongfully taken from his own premises,
but it follows, logically, from this common-law rule, that every person must
positively keep his own cattle safely on
his own premises, or lie is liable for their
damage elsewhere. But in many states,
either by force of statutes, or otherwise,
the above common-law rule is not in
force, and every landowner must maintain fences to keep other cattle out, and
not merely to keep his own in, and consequently he has no remedy for cattle
straying upon his land through the want
or insufficiency of such fences. This is
perfectly well established as to partition
fences, and very possibly it may be so as
to fences along the highway. If so, of
course, he is remediless in such cases.
BniutDmUn H. BENNETT.

